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INTERPRETATION AND ACCESSIBILITY 
KAREN PETROSKI* 
INTRODUCTION 
Professor Eskridge’s lecture reminds us that the issue of interpretation—
and statutory interpretation in particular—has been a topic of discussion 
among judges and legal theorists for decades. Yet there is clearly still much 
more to say on the matter. And despite the consistently recognized centrality of 
interpretation to legal practice, interpretation remains a highly contested 
undertaking—not only in its application, but in its very description. What are 
we talking about when we refer to statutory interpretation? Is it a matter of 
what lawyers and judges do already, or a matter of self-conscious practice? 
Should it be one or the other, or is it satisfactory for it to be both? Would these 
questions be answered differently from a scholar’s perspective and from a 
judge’s? Should they be? These last questions have new significance in the 
contemporary legal academy, in which the relationships among teaching, 
scholarship, and practice are being critically re-examined and might be in the 
process of being reformed in a lasting way. 
My remarks will not answer these questions but will, rather, seek to make 
the case for asking them explicitly and discussing the answers we would want 
to endorse as a responsible educational community. Below, I first discuss the 
central role that the concept of interpretation has played in dominant scholarly 
theories of law and legal activity. Then, I briefly examine the influence (or lack 
of influence) of this theoretical trend on the law school curriculum. I then turn 
to the current climate of legal education, and in particular the impact of the 
discourse of accessibility in contemporary discussions of this institution and 
the reasons the imperative of accessibility might be an elusive goal. I conclude 
by identifying some key questions for community discussion that emerge from 
the developments I describe, focusing on the question of whether legal theory 
and legal interpretation can be, or should be, radically accessible activities. 
 
* Assistant Professor, Saint Louis University School of Law. Thanks to Jonathan Bollozos and 
Jordan Panger for research assistance and to William Eskridge, Joel Goldstein, and the other 
participants in the 2012 Childress Lecture proceedings—especially Liz O’Brien and the staff of 
the Saint Louis University Law Journal—for making possible the forum in which these ideas 
were initially presented. 
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I.  THE CENTRALITY OF INTERPRETATION TO MODERN THEORIES OF LAW 
The history of modern Anglo-American legal theory is partly a story about 
the rise to dominance of legal positivism, as Professor Eskridge’s paper (and 
Professor Shapiro’s recent book, discussed further below) have recounted. But 
it is also a story of increasing attention to the close relationship—perhaps even 
amounting to an identity—between those practices we call “legal” and the 
human activity we call “interpretation,” which I will define for purposes of this 
discussion as referring to the identification of the meaning or significance of 
communications. 
Professor Eskridge notes this connection very early in his lecture, when he 
remarks that since 1957, statutory interpretation has been a “locus for 
jurisprudential theory.”1 Herbert Hart’s exchange with Lon Fuller of that year 
took the practice of statutory interpretation to be illustrative of the implications 
and shortcomings of legal positivism.2 But this focus by legal theorists on the 
interpretation of statutes dates back well beyond the mid-twentieth century. 
Those fathers of Anglo-American positivism Jeremy Bentham and John 
Austin, at the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth centuries, 
both also treated legislation and its interpretation as core components of their 
theories of law.3 
As the presentations in this symposium show, Anglo-American 
jurisprudence since the Hart-Fuller debate has continued to draw on statutory 
interpretation as a central example and a proving ground for theories of law.4 
Most of the scholars since Hart and Fuller who have sought to explain what is 
unique about what lawyers and judges do have made interpretation central to 
that explanation. Since the 1970s, for example, Ronald Dworkin has been 
developing a theory of law (which has since evolved into a more general 
 
 1. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Nino’s Nightmare: Legal Process Theory as a Jurisprudence of 
Toggling Between Facts and Norms, 57 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 865, 866 (2013). 
 2. See H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 
593, 607–11 (1958); Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law—A Reply to Professor Hart, 
71 HARV. L. REV. 630, 661–69 (1958). 
 3. See JEREMY BENTHAM, THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 323–25 
(Prometheus Books 1988) (1789); JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE 
DETERMINED 10–17, 31–32, 107–08 (Wilfrid Rumble ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1995) (1832). 
 4. See, e.g., James J. Brudney, Faithful Agency Versus Ordinary Meaning Advocacy, 57 ST. 
LOUIS U. L.J. 975 (2013) (observing that certain approaches, including the ordinary meaning 
approach, “is promoted by liberals and conservatives, purposivists as well as textualists”); 
Victoria F. Nourse, Decision Theory and Babbitt v. Sweet Home: Skepticism About Norms, 
Discretion, and the Virtues of Purposivism, 57 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 909 (2013) (explaining that 
norms are drawn from a diversity of areas and that normativity, as a result, deserves more 
academic attention and less “closeting”). 
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theory of morality) that centers on interpretation.5 According to Dworkin 
today, not only is law basically an “interpretive” activity, but so is morality 
more generally.6 An implication of his position is that if we can reach an 
understanding of interpretation, we will be able to understand what makes law 
and legal activity what they are. 
Dworkin is not usually classed as a legal positivist,7 and as Professor 
Eskridge has explained, there is no necessary connection between the 
assumption that interpretation is central to legal activity and the positivist 
position that we can describe law fully without recourse to normative 
statements.8 But theorists who account for the nature of law quite differently 
from Dworkin share his emphasis on the centrality of interpretation to their 
accounts of law. Antonin Scalia, for example—considered by some observers 
to be an orthodox positivist, or to represent himself as such—has also made 
legal interpretation, specifically the interpretation of statutes and constitutional 
text, central to his account of what law is and what it should be, at least from 
the judge’s perspective.9 And Scott Shapiro, who has recently advanced a 
theory of law that seeks to bridge the divide between positivist and non-
positivist theories, has also, in the process, put interpretation in general and 
statutory interpretation in particular at the core of his theory of what law is and 
what it should be.10 Shapiro advances a theory that understands legal rules as 
plans; he supports his account mostly through examples of rules that are either 
analogous to or actually are legislative enactments.11 Moreover, he argues that 
his theory is accurate specifically because it justifies a defensible approach to 
interpretation.12 
Many of the most prominent contemporary legal theorists writing in 
English thus seem to agree that to understand what law is and how it functions, 
we need to understand legal interpretation, and especially statutory 
interpretation. As a result, as Professor Eskridge’s lecture indicates, most of 
these theorists also offer theories of statutory interpretation as components of 
their theories of law. Yet these theorists disagree in some fundamental ways 
about what law is and, accordingly, about the most appropriate or best theory 
 
 5. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY vii–xv (1977); RONALD DWORKIN, 
LAW’S EMPIRE 87–113, 225–28, 410–13 (1986); RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE IN ROBES 6–7, 34–
35 (2006); RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS 1–19, 400–15 (2011). 
 6. See DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS, supra note 5, at 166–70, 400–09. 
 7. SCOTT J. SHAPIRO, LEGALITY 265–67 (2011). 
 8. Eskridge, supra note 1, at 867–68, 894, 906–07. 
 9. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 9–
18, 37–44 (1997); ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE 
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 51 (2012). 
 10. See generally SHAPIRO, supra note 7. 
 11. Id. at 119, 195–97, 225. 
 12. Id. at 170–73. 
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of statutory interpretation. They also disagree, albeit less explicitly, about what 
interpretation itself is. They seem to concur that some activity related to 
communication, meaning, and action lies at the core of legal activity, but their 
characterizations of that activity vary widely. For Dworkin, for example, 
interpretation is a realization of community values, a form of conceptual and 
cognitive harmonization.13 For Scalia, it is more concretely a form of fidelity 
to textual authority, or as he puts it in his most recent book, “how a legal 
message is to be received by those who must apply its directives.”14 For 
Shapiro, interpretation involves the implementation of plans that happen to be 
expressed in texts to resolve otherwise irresolvable moral quandaries.15 
Legal theorists thus agree that a central part of what lawyers and judges do, 
and should be doing, is interpreting the law, with statutes understood as the 
paradigmatic form of the law. They also seem generally to agree, despite their 
theoretical differences, that interpretation requires some shared understanding 
or community to work.16 But apparently no shared understanding of that 
practice itself exists; in fact, these theorists distinguish themselves from one 
another in part based on the differences between their accounts of what 
interpretation—and therefore law—is. 
II.  THE STATUS OF INTERPRETATION IN THE LEGAL ACADEMY 
Legal theorists like Dworkin, Scalia, and Shapiro are presenting 
descriptions of what law is, and we recognize them as experts on this matter. 
We also know from our everyday experience, however, that whatever else law 
is, what lawyers and judges do must count as law. And in the United States, 
part of what lawyers and judges have in common is their education within a 
particular institution: the law school. If the theorists are right that interpretation 
is central to what lawyers and judges do and should be doing, then it might 
seem to follow that in educating future lawyers and judges, we should be 
teaching them how to perform that activity, and it might also follow that we 
need to teach them what the activity is that they are being taught. But it is far 
from clear that we are doing this. 
In his most recent book, for example, Scalia argues that we are not.17 And 
indeed, the law school curriculum does not focus directly on legal or statutory 
interpretation outside of courses on legislation and some constitutional law 
 
 13. See DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS, supra note 5, at 160–70. 
 14. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 9, at 42. 
 15. See SHAPIRO, supra note 7, at 201–02, 213–14. 
 16. See DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS, supra note 5, at 160–62, 405–07; SCALIA & 
GARNER, supra note 9, at xxvii; SHAPIRO, supra note 7, at 204–06. 
 17. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 9, at 7–9. 
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courses.18 At many law schools, these are not required courses.19 A concern 
that students at such schools might graduate without any explicit instruction in 
either the theory or practice of legal interpretation motivated several 
participants in this symposium to urge strongly that these courses be made a 
standard part of law school coursework. 
On the other hand, if legal interpretation is nothing more than the practice 
of understanding the law and constructing arguments about what it means—as 
some theorists might argue20—then the existing law school curriculum is 
already addressing and teaching legal interpretation, perhaps sufficiently. It 
might be that students need not be taught what interpretation is, as long as they 
are taught how to do it. And if scholars and educators cannot agree about 
exactly what interpretation is, it might be futile to expect more than this kind of 
diffuse training in interpretation as a kind of “know-how.”21 
Is this enough? Should law professors be debating the nature of law and 
legal interpretation if we cannot explain how this debate relates to what goes 
on in law school classrooms? It is becoming increasingly difficult to answer 
this question affirmatively—not just when focusing on the sufficiency of 
instruction in legal interpretation in the current legal curriculum, but also when 
considering other aspects of the standard legal curriculum. Long-term concerns 
about the shape of legal education have become more urgent over the past 
several years.22 We are hearing and talking more and more about the gaps 
 
 18. Id.; see also Ethan J. Leib, Adding Legislation Courses to the First-Year Curriculum, 58 
J. LEGAL EDUC. 166, 169 (2008) (advocating the addition of legislative courses to first-year law 
school curricula). 
 19. Of the nineteen law schools whose 2012–13 curricula were surveyed for this essay, only 
six (Harvard, Columbia, New York University, Georgetown, University of California-Hastings, 
and Fordham) require a course in Legislation (usually in the form of a second-semester course in 
legislation and regulation). See Appendix, infra. A similar proportion of law schools offer courses 
in legislative drafting or legislative clinics. See id. Courses focusing specifically on legal 
interpretation appear rare outside the most elite law schools. See id. 
 20. See, e.g., DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 5, at 87–113, 225–28, 410–13; SHAPIRO, 
supra note 7, at 302–06. 
 21. See, e.g., HARRY COLLINS & ROBERT EVANS, RETHINKING EXPERTISE 23 (2007) (“Over 
the last half-century, the most important transformation in the way expertise has been understood 
is a move . . . toward a . . . wisdom-based or competence-based model. . . . [E]xpertise is now 
seen more and more as something practical—something based in what you can do rather than 
what you can calculate or learn.”). 
 22. See, e.g., JOSEF REDLICH, THE COMMON LAW AND THE CASE METHOD IN AMERICAN 
UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOLS: A REPORT TO THE CARNEGIE FOUNDATION FOR THE 
ADVANCEMENT OF TEACHING 18–22 (1914) (evidencing that similar concerns have been present 
in legal education for a century now); WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS: 
PREPARATION FOR THE PROFESSION OF LAW 87–126, 162–84 (2007) (explaining the need for a 
move to more practical application-based curricula and the obstacles to such an effort); Harry T. 
Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91 
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between legal education and legal practice, between academic activities and 
the real world, between theory and the things that lawyers and judges actually 
do.23 In this climate, defending the status quo is increasingly difficult. To 
understand what these developments mean for scholarship and teaching about 
legal and statutory interpretation, we need to consider what is occurring 
outside scholars’ bookshelves and law school classrooms—and even outside 
lawyers’ offices and judges’ chambers. 
III.  ACCESSIBILITY AND INACCESSIBILITY IN LEGAL EDUCATION 
“Accessibility” has been a rallying cry of academic reformers in the United 
States since the emergence of modern institutions of higher education in this 
country in the late nineteenth century.24 In recent decades, prompted by 
economic, demographic, political, and technological shifts, this theme has 
taken on new implications. Over the past generation or so, policymakers, 
administrators, and the public have come to conceive of higher education as 
part of a more general system of private enterprise, rather than as a public 
good.25 One result of this shift has been to encourage those making policy 
decisions and seeking funding for the academy to define their goals and 
activities in private-enterprise terms.26 This new way of describing academic 
activity requires the identification of educational products and direct 
communication with the market for those products. 
Those who focus on the legal academy have seen these trends in several 
specific developments over the past couple of years. An even wider audience 
learned of them through the series of articles by David Segal published in the 
New York Times starting in January of 2011.27 Segal’s pieces, critical of law 
 
MICH. L. REV. 34, 34–35, 42 (1992) (drawing attention to the disparity between academia and 
practice and its detrimental effects on the legal profession); see also infra Part III. 
 23. See discussion infra Part III. 
 24. See, e.g., ARTHUR M. COHEN & CARRIE B. KISKER, THE SHAPING OF AMERICAN 
HIGHER EDUCATION: EMERGENCE AND GROWTH OF THE CONTEMPORARY SYSTEM 420–21, 
464–78 (2d ed. 2010); see generally BILL READINGS, THE UNIVERSITY IN RUINS (1996). 
 25. See COHEN & KISKER, supra note 24, at 514–49, 559–61; see also READINGS, supra 
note 24, at 164–65, 177. 
 26. See SHEILA SLAUGHTER & GARY RHOADES, ACADEMIC CAPITALISM AND THE NEW 
ECONOMY 1–4, 181–206 (2004) (describing higher education entities’ shift to using profit-
focused methods and terminology in their operations). 
 27. David Segal, Is Law School a Losing Game?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2011, at BU1; David 
Segal, Behind the Curve, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2011, at BU1; David Segal, Law School 
Economics: Ka-Ching!, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2011, at BU1; David Segal, What They Don’t Teach 
Law Students: Lawyering, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2011, at A1; David Segal, A Possible New 
Curriculum, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2011, at N23; David Segal, The Price to Play Its Way, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 18, 2011, at BU1; David Segal, For 2nd Year, a Sharp Drop in Law School Entrance 
Tests, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2012, at B1; see also Editorial, Legal Education Reform, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 26, 2011, at A18; Archive of Articles in Room for Debate: The Case Against Law 
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schools’ financial models and curricula, brought renewed attention to the Law 
School Transparency (LST) initiative begun in 2009 by two law students.28 
Dedicated to “improving consumer information and to reforming the 
traditional law school model,” along the lines of disclosure initiatives in other 
sectors, LST gathers and makes available data about the employment of U.S. 
law school graduates.29 Faculty from prominent law schools have also joined 
student and journalistic demands for access to information and for institutional, 
curricular, and financial reform: two especially influential examples are Brian 
Tamanaha of Washington University, who published a book-length critique 
with a major academic press in 2012,30 and Paul Campos of the University of 
Colorado, who from August 2011 to early 2013 posted daily exposes on his 
blog, Inside the Law School Scam.31 
All of these initiatives describe the academy, and the legal academy in 
particular, as an accessible space that should be offering accessible products.32 
The products in question include student degrees but also, traditionally, 
scholarship. The differences between these products—and their potential 
irrelevance to one another—are familiar themes in the academic reform 
discussion.33 Their similarities are less often noted, but these similarities are 
important, especially for the topic of this symposium. Both the scholarly and 
the educational products of the legal academy are specialized discourse 
products: for students, the ability to participate in a specialized discourse 
community,34 and for scholars, contributions to a different specialized 
discourse community in which various features of the first discourse 
community are discussed and debated.35 
 
School, N.Y. TIMES (July 21, 2011), www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/07/21/the-case-
against-law-school. 
 28. See generally LAW SCH. TRANSPARENCY, http://www.lawschooltransparency.com (last 
visited Jan. 6, 2013). Media mentions of LST have increased throughout 2011 and 2012. LST 
Recognition, LAW SCH. TRANSPARENCY, http://www.lawschooltransparency.com/recognition 
(last visited Jan. 6, 2013). 
 29. About LST, LAW SCH. TRANSPARENCY, http://www.lawschooltransparency.com/about 
(last visited Jan. 6, 2013). 
 30. BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, FAILING LAW SCHOOLS (2012). 
 31. Paul F. Campos, INSIDE THE LAW SCH. SCAM, http://insidethelawschoolscam.blog 
spot.com (last visited Mar. 18, 2013). 
 32. See, e.g., Paul F. Campos, Bleg: Help Circulate the Law School Transparency Petition, 
INSIDE THE LAW SCH. SCAM (Oct. 21, 2011, 6:05 a.m.), http://insidethelawschoolscam.blogspot. 
com/2011/10/bleg-circulating-law-school.html; supra notes 25–26; text accompanying supra note 
29. 
 33. See supra note 27. 
 34. See, e.g., ELIZABETH MERTZ, THE LANGUAGE OF LAW SCHOOL: LEARNING TO “THINK 
LIKE A LAWYER” 3–4 (2007). 
 35. For a summary of some of the literature exploring academic discourse communities, see 
Karen Petroski, Does It Matter What We Say About Legal Interpretation?, 43 MCGEORGE L. 
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Scholars have always had to make a case for the utility of what they are 
doing, but there is now more pressure on them than ever before to make that 
case in terms accessible to their consumers, and their institutional environment 
is reinforcing that pressure.36 In the legal academy, this translates into a drive 
to make legal education accessible to outsiders: to define the enterprise in a 
way that can be understood and valued by everyone. Since part of the 
enterprise involves the production of scholarship, there is pressure to make that 
product, too—including theories of law and interpretation—as accessible as 
possible. Shapiro’s and Scalia’s recent books are wonderful examples of the 
effects of this pressure, and their inherent interest and conceptual rigor are not 
compromised by their accessibility.37 
The above discussion probably understates the importance of the 
imperative of accessibility in the contemporary legal academy, as well as 
higher education more generally. But accessibility is not the only imperative 
affecting the work of legal scholars and educators. Indeed, certain structural 
features of higher education and law, as those systems have developed in the 
United States over the past century, make accessibility a real challenge to 
attain. For one thing, the structure of scholarly enterprise encourages scholars 
to stake out personal positions that differ from the positions taken by other 
scholars, often on minor points.38 The scholarly products of the academy, that 
is, are produced within a system that has classically rewarded producers of 
those products that both document their producers’ expertise—measured by the 
embedding of those products within a system of specialized communication—
and contribute to the continued functioning of such systems of specialized 
communication—by prompting differentiated responses from other producers 
or sometimes entire subsystems of new products applying details of earlier 
scholarly products to new topics.39 The best works of legal theory—including 
Professor Eskridge’s work—perform the latter function; they are not just 
 
REV. 359, 368–74 (2012) [hereinafter Petroski, Does It Matter] (discussing “[s]cholarly 
approaches to the study of academic practice”); Karen Petroski, Legal Fictions and the Limits of 
Legal Language, INT’L J. L. IN CONTEXT (forthcoming 2013). 
 36. See, e.g., SLAUGHTER & RHOADES, supra note 26, at 22–23, 29, 113–16, 302, 333. 
 37. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Forward to SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 9, at xxvi. 
 38. See, e.g., ANDREW ABBOTT, CHAOS OF DISCIPLINES 21–27 (2001); RANDALL COLLINS, 
THE SOCIOLOGY OF PHILOSOPHIES: A GLOBAL THEORY OF INTELLECTUAL CHANGE 80–82 
(1998). 
 39. See, e.g., Dennis J. Callahan & Neal Devins, Law Review Article Placement: Benefit or 
Beauty Prize?, 56 J. LEGAL EDUC. 374, 375 (2006) (arguing that high-quality articles are cited 
regardless of the review’s prestige); Deborah J. Merritt & Melanie Putnam, Judges and Scholars: 
Do Courts and Scholarly Journals Cite the Same Law Review Articles?, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
871, 888–90 (1996) (finding that articles published in more prestigious schools’ journals are more 
likely to be cited); Petroski, Does It Matter, supra note 35, at 366 n.35, 387–88; Ronald D. 
Rotunda, Law Reviews—The Extreme Centrist Position, 62 IND. L.J. 1, 8 (1986) (discussing 
article selection). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2013] INTERPRETATION AND ACCESSIBILITY 1011 
exercises in hairsplitting that are comprehensible only to a handful of 
specialists, but speak to experts in a number of areas. This kind of scholarly 
work is not possible, however, in the absence of a broader field of 
differentiated specialist knowledge areas that a path-breaking theorist can 
bridge through his or her work. The consequences of these dynamics of 
scholarly production include the diversity of scholarly positions that Professor 
Eskridge explores in his lecture and that, well beyond this symposium, fill the 
pages of law reviews and the shelves of law school libraries.40 
A second force in the legal academy working against accessibility is the 
nature of legal training, which gives graduates the ability to participate in a 
particular professional discourse that the general public is unable to navigate. 
Like other professional discourses, legal discourse depends for its authority on 
being nontransferable, or in a certain sense inaccessible.41 Clients need lawyers 
because nonlawyers lack the ability to communicate according to legal 
conventions; lawyers’ ability to so communicate is fundamental to every 
service they perform as lawyers. It follows that, should those conventions 
become available to and understandable by all—should they become radically 
accessible—the demand for lawyers’ services would disappear or at least 
change virtually beyond recognition.42 Even if legal education were to be 
reformed to address only and all of what lawyers-in-training need to know and 
do in order to join the profession, then, it would continue to involve training in 
an inherently esoteric art. 
In both of these senses, there is a certain devotion to inaccessibility built 
into the project of legal education. We can understand the current crisis in that 
institution as, among other things, a product of the clash of these competing 
pressures toward accessibility and away from it, particularly as those pressures 
are manifested in communicative products and skills. 
CONCLUSION: ACCESSIBILITY ALL THE WAY UP? 
Given the imperative of accessibility, can we accept a continued 
commitment to inaccessibility in the projects of legal education, scholarship, 
and theory? Should we? Or should we strive for accessibility all the way up? I 
present these remarks in the hope that they might inspire others to agree with 
 
 40. See Karen Petroski, Is Post-Positivism Possible?, 12 GERMAN L.J. 663, 681–84 (2011) 
(discussion of how several particular scholars have fit into the development of Anglo-American 
legal positivism in comparable ways, despite the distinct subject matter and approach of each 
individual). 
 41. See, e.g., ANDREW ABBOTT, THE SYSTEM OF PROFESSIONS: AN ESSAY ON THE 
DIVISION OF EXPERT LABOR 86–91 (1988). 
 42. See, e.g., RICHARD SUSSKIND, THE END OF LAWYERS?: RETHINKING THE NATURE OF 
LEGAL SERVICES 6–7 (2008). 
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me that we need to discuss these questions more explicitly if we hope to make 
real progress on the task of legal education reform. 
The theoretical disagreement over what exactly interpretation is—despite 
the agreement that whatever it is, it is central to what lawyers do—is 
encouraged by the dynamics of scholarly activity, and also perhaps by a shared 
and only partly recognized drive to keep the core activity of lawyers 
contestable and inaccessible. The absence of consensus about what 
interpretation involves is not just a result of scholarly competition or a focus on 
an inherently elusive concept but also a matter of collective, tribal self-
preservation. We will need to decide as a group whether this reluctance to 
work toward a common and easily communicated understanding of our core 
activity is something we want to work against. We will need to decide, that is, 
whether we want the concept and practice of legal interpretation to be radically 
accessible, whether accessibility would change that practice beyond 
recognition, and whether a society operating with a radically accessible form 
of legal interpretation is the society we want. There are no simple answers to 
these questions, but it will be hard to agree on the direction legal education 
should take if we do not address them. 
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APPENDIX: COURSES ON LEGISLATION AND INTERPRETATION OFFERED AT 
SELECTED LAW SCHOOLS DURING THE 2012–13 ACADEMIC YEAR 
Columbia Law School: Requires 1Ls to take Foundations of the Regulatory 
State (three credits). First-year students may also elect to take courses on 
Legislation (three credits) or Legislation and Regulation (three credits; both of 
these courses are also open to upper-level students). In 2012–13, offered 
upper-level electives on Advanced Constitutional Law: Law and Political 
Process (three credits); The Constitution (two credits; a seminar on techniques 
of constitutional interpretation); a seminar on Contracts, Collaboration and 
Interpretation (three credits); a course on Financial Statement Analysis and 
Interpretation (three credits); a seminar on History and Constitutional 
Authority (two credits); a seminar on Legal Interpretation (three credits; 
focusing primarily on statutory and constitutional interpretation); and a course 
on Reading the Constitution (two credits).43 
Fordham University School of Law: In fall 2012, offered an intensive course 
in Congressional Investigations (two credits), and the 1L course in Legislation 
and Regulation for evening students (four credits). Appears to require 1Ls to 
take a spring course in Legislation and Regulation (offered in spring 2013, five 
sections, four credits). Also offered in spring 2013 a course in Legislative 
Drafting (three credits). Has previously offered courses in Constitutional 
Interpretation (fall 2010, three credits); Election Law (spring 2010, fall 2010, 
two credits); Election Law and the Presidency (spring 2012, three credits); 
History, Originalism, and the Founders’ Constitution (spring 2012, two 
credits); Language of the Constitution (spring 2010, two credits); Legislative 
Drafting (fall 2010, three credits); Regulatory Drafting (three credits); and 
Statutory Interpretation and Separation of Powers (fall 2010, two credits).44 
Georgetown University Law Center: In fall 2012, offered an elective in 
Federal Money: Policymaking and Budget Rules (three credits); an elective 
seminar on Lawmaking and Statutory Interpretation (three credits); the upper-
level elective Lawmaking: Introduction to Statutory and Regulatory 
Interpretation (three credits); an upper-level elective Tax Treaties: A Practical 
Approach to Interpretation and Application (one credit); and a Federal 
Legislation and Administrative Clinic (up to ten credits). A planned seminar in 
Congressional Investigations (three credits) was cancelled. In spring 2013, 
required the first-year course Government Processes (four credits), and offered 
 
 43. See Courses, COLUMBIA L. SCH., http://www.law.columbia.edu/courses (last visited 
Mar. 31, 2013). 
 44. See Past Course Offerings, FORDHAM SCH. OF L., http://law.fordham.edu/registrar/ 
2775.htm (last visited Mar. 31, 2013); Class Schedules, FORDHAM SCH. OF L., http://law.ford 
ham.edu/registrar/2750.htm (last visited Mar. 31, 2013); Course Descriptions, FORDHAM SCH. OF 
L., http://law.fordham.edu/16158.htm (last visited Mar. 31, 2013). 
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the upper-level electives Congressional Investigations Seminar (two credits); 
Congressional Procedure and Legislative History Seminar (three credits); the 
How to Work the Hill: A Guide to Lawyering in the Congress practicum (five 
credits); a continuation of the Lawmaking and Statutory Interpretation seminar 
(two credits); Lawmaking: Introduction to Statutory and Regulatory 
Interpretation (three credits); and Political and Lobbying Activities of Tax-
Exempt Organizations (two credits); as well as a continuation of the Federal 
Legislation and Administrative Clinic (up to ten credits).45 
Harvard Law School: Required first-years to take a course in Legislation and 
Regulation (seven sections, in spring 2013). In fall 2012, offered an upper-
level seminar in Advanced Legislation: Theories of Statutory Interpretation, 
and an upper-level elective on Law and the Political Process. In spring 2013, 
offered an elective (taught by a Kennedy School professor) on the U.S. 
Congress and Law Making (covering the legislative process).46 
New York University School of Law: In fall 2012, offered a course on 
Legislation and the Regulatory State (four credits) for transfer and LLM 
students. In spring 2013, offered a required 1L course on Legislation and the 
Regulatory State (four credits, four sections), as well as electives on Federal 
Budget Policy and Process (two or three credits); Legislation and Political 
Theory (three or four credits); and The Law of Democracy (four credits).47 
Northwestern University School of Law: In fall 2012, offered an elective in 
American Democracy (three credits). No legislation-related courses were 
offered during the winter term. In spring 2013, offered an elective in 
Legislation (three credits).48 
Stanford Law School: In fall 2012, offered electives on Direct Democracy 
(two or three credits) and Statutory Interpretation (three credits), as well as a 
course on the legislative process, Legislative Simulation: The Federal Budget 
(three credits). In winter 2013, offered an elective on The United States Senate 
as a Legal Institution (three credits; taught by Russ Feingold). In spring 2013, 
offered an elective on Regulation of the Political Process (four credits).49 
 
 45. See Curriculum Guide: Courses, GEORGETOWN UNIV. L. CTR., http://apps.law.george 
town.edu/curriculum/tab_courses.cfm (last visited Mar. 31, 2013). 
 46. See Harvard Law School Course Catalog, HARVARD L. SCH., http://www.law.harvard. 
edu/academics/curriculum/catalog/index.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2013). 
 47. See Search Course Descriptions, N.Y. UNIV. SCH. OF L., https://its.law.nyu.edu/courses/ 
index.cfm? (last visited Mar. 31, 2013). 
 48. See Course Catalog, NORTHWESTERN UNIV. SCH. OF L., http://www.law.northwestern. 
edu/curriculum/coursecatalog/term.cfm (last visited Mar. 31, 2013). 
 49. See Courses, STANFORD L. SCH., http://www.law.stanford.edu/courses (last visited Mar. 
31, 2013). 
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University of California, Berkeley School of Law: In fall 2012, offered an 
elective on the Law of Democracy (three credits). In spring 2013, offered an 
elective on Legislation (three credits).50 
University of California, Hastings College of the Law: Requires 1Ls to take 
a “Statutory Elective” in the spring semester; in spring 2013, the elective 
options were Education Law; Employment Discrimination Law; 
Environmental Law; Federal Income Taxation; and Legislation, Statutory 
Interpretation, and the Administrative State (each three units). In fall 2012, 
offered a course on Legislative Process (three units) and a Public Policy 
Advocacy Seminar (two units). In spring 2013, offered a course in Statutory 
Interpretation and Bill Drafting (three units); an Advanced Legislative Process 
Seminar (two units); and a Voting Rights Seminar (two units); as well as a 
Legislation Clinic (up to twelve points).51 
University of California, Los Angeles School of Law: In fall 2012, offered 
an upper-level elective on Statutory Interpretation (two credits). Did not offer 
any legislation- or interpretation-related courses in spring 2013; a skills course 
on Public Policy Advocacy was not offered in the 2012–13 year.52 
University of Chicago Law School: In fall 2012, offered an elective on Legal 
Interpretation (three credits, taught by Judge Frank Easterbrook). No 
interpretation courses were offered during the winter quarter, although Election 
Law (three credits) was offered. In spring 2012, offered an elective in 
Legislation and Statutory Interpretation (three credits), as well as one in Public 
Choice (three credits). Throughout the year, offered a Mental Health Advocacy 
Clinic (one to two credits, includes legislative advocacy).53 
University of Michigan Law School: In fall 2012, offered an elective on 
Legislation and Regulation (four credits), and an upper-level elective on 
Voting Rights and Election Law (four credits, two sections). In spring 2013, 
again offered the Legislation and Regulation elective (four credits).54 
University of Missouri School of Law: Offered no legislation- or 
interpretation-focused courses in fall 2012, but did offer an upper-level elective 
in Election Law (one to three credits). In spring 2013, offered upper-level 
elective on Legislation (one to three credits) and a Legislative Practicum (one 
 
 50. See Courses@Boalt, BERKELEY SCH. OF L., http://www.law.berkeley.edu/php-pro 
grams/courses/courseSearch.php (last visited Mar. 31, 2013). 
 51. See UNIV. OF CALIF. HASTINGS SCH. OF L., 2012–2013 Course Catalog 3–4, 26, 41, 29, 
31, 44, 56–57 (2012), http://www.uchastings.edu/academics/catalog/docs/CAT12-13.pdf. 
 52. See Curriculum Guide, UCLA SCH. OF L., https://curriculum.law.ucla.edu/Guide/All 
Courses/ (last visited Mar. 31, 2013). 
 53. See Offerings, UNIV. OF CHI. L. SCH., http://www.law.uchicago.edu/courses (last visited 
Mar. 31, 2013). 
 54. See Office of Student Records, UNIV. OF MICH. L. SCH., http://www.law.umich.edu/ 
currentstudents/registration/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Mar. 31, 2013). 
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to three credits). Previously-offered courses not offered in 2012–13 included 
an elective on Advocacy and Government Agencies (one to three credits).55 
University of Missouri, Kansas City School of Law: Fall 2012 course 
listings were not available in spring 2013. In spring 2013, offered no 
legislation- or interpretation-related courses. Lists as occasionally offered a 
course in Legislation (two to three units) and a Seminar in Constitutional 
Interpretation (two to three units).56 
University of Pennsylvania Law School: In fall 2012, offered an elective on 
the Originalism Debate and the Constitution (three credits). In spring 2013, 
offered electives on Election Law (two credits) and Political Law (two credits), 
as well as a Legislative Clinic (two credits).57 
University of Texas at Austin School of Law: In fall 2012, offered a clinical 
program in Legislative Lawyering (three credits, with a three-credit practice 
skills companion course) and an elective in Texas Legislation: Practice and 
Procedure (two credits, taught by former Texas legislator J.E. Brown). In 
spring 2013, offered an elective in Antitrust: Economic Analysis and 
Legislative Interpretation (four credits); a continuation of the Legislative 
Lawyering clinic and practice skills course (three credits apiece); a Legislative 
Internship (three credits); an elective seminar on Originalism and Its Critics 
(two credits); and an elective seminar on Legislative Process (three credits).58 
University of Virginia School of Law: In fall 2012, offered electives on 
Constitutionalism: History and Jurisprudence (three credits); Legislative 
Drafting and Public Policy (three credits); and Regulation of the Political 
Process (three credits). No legislation-oriented courses were offered during the 
January term. In spring 2013, offered electives on Government Ethics: 
Conflicts of Interest, Lobbying, and Campaign Finance (three credits), and 
Legislation (three credits).59 
Washington University School of Law: In fall 2012, offered an intensive-
course elective on The Interaction of Business, Government, and Public Policy 
in a Democratic Society (one credit), and a Congressional and Administrative 
 
 55. See JD Program Course Descriptions, UNIV. OF MO. SCH. OF L., http://law.missouri. 
edu/academics/curriculum.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2013). 
 56. See UNIV. OF MO. KANSAS CITY SCH. OF L., UMKC School of Law Alphabetical Course 
Listing 5, 20, http://www1.law.umkc.edu/academic/Course_Listings.pdf (last visited Mar. 31, 
2013); UNIV. OF MO. KANSAS CITY SCH. OF L, University of Missouri-Kansas City School of 
Law—Schedule of Courses Spring Semester 2013 13 (2013), http://law.umkc.edu/pdfs/ 
registration-sp13-course-schedule.pdf (last visited Mar. 31, 2013). 
 57. See Penn Law Spring 2013 Courses, UNIV. OF PENN. L. SCH., https://courses.law.upenn. 
edu (last visited Mar. 31, 2013). 
 58. See Course Schedule and Descriptions, UNIV. OF TEX. AT AUSTIN SCH. OF L., 
http://utdirect.utexas.edu/loreg/clst.WBX (last visited Mar. 31, 2013). 
 59. See Current Courses, UNIV. OF VA. SCH. OF L., http://lawnotes2.law.virginia.edu/ 
lawweb/course.nsf/CbTbN (last visited Mar. 31, 2013). 
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Law Internship (up to fourteen credits). In spring 2013, offered an upper-level 
elective on Legislation (three credits); an elective seminar on American 
Democracy and the Policy Making Process (three credits); an intensive-course 
elective on The Interaction of Business, Government, and Public Policy in a 
Democratic Society (one credit); an elective course on Organizing, Coalition 
Building, and Lobbying (three credits); and the Congressional and 
Administrative Law Internship (up to fourteen credits).60 
Yale Law School: In fall 2012, offered an upper-level elective on Legislation 
(four credits) and a Legislative Advocacy Clinic (three credits). Also offered 
upper-level seminars on Reading the Constitution: Method and Substance (four 
credits) and The Judicial Role in Constitutional Interpretation: Comparing the 
U.S. and Canada (one or two credits), as well as a reading group on 
Contemporary Originalism (one credit). In spring 2013, offered electives 
Introduction to the Regulatory State (three credits, open to 1Ls, but not 
mandatory), The Law of Democracy (three credits, covering some aspects of 
the legislative process), and Legislation (three credits), as well as a 
continuation of the Legislative Advocacy Clinic, and an elective (open to 1Ls) 
on The Politics of Method: Law and Economics and Originalism (two 
credits).61 
 
  
 
 60. See Course Information and Directory, WASHINGTON UNIV. SCH. OF L., http://law. 
wustl.edu/registrar/pages.aspx?id=2124 (last visited Mar. 31, 2013). 
 61. See Fall 2012 Course Overview, YALE L. SCH., http://ylsinfo.law.yale.edu/wsw/prereg/ 
course_overview.asp?Term=Fall (last visited Mar. 31, 2013). 
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